Clark v. City of Medicine Hat — Full decision

By Collin Gallant on August 26, 2024.

Medicine Hat News

The full text of a decision rendered in the judicial review of Linnsie Clark vs. City of Medicine Hat, released on Monday, August 26 by Court of King’s Bench:

Court of King’s Bench of Alberta

Citation: Clark v City of Medicine Hat, 2024 ABKB 513

Date: 20240826

Docket: 2401 06966

Registry: Calgary

Between:

Mayor Linnsie Clark

Applicant

– and –

The City of Medicine Hat and the Council of the City of Medicine Hat

Respondent

_______________________________________________________

Reasons for Decision

of the

Honourable Justice R.E. Nation

_______________________________________________________

[1] This is an application for a judicial review of a decision made by the Council for the City of Medicine Hat (Council) on March 21, 2024, after an investigation under the Code of Conduct Bylaw 4492 (“the Code”), of the conduct of Mayor Linnsie Clark (Clark). The judicial review also extends to the sanction imposed by Council. At the March meeting, Council reviewed a report prepared by an independent investigator (the Kingsgate Report) and voted to accept certain findings in that report and imposed the following sanctions:

1. publication of a letter of reprimand and request for an apology;

2. suspension of Clark’s presiding duties under section 154 of the Municipal

Government Act, RSA 2000, c M-26 (MGA);

3. Clark will no longer be the official spokesperson for Council;

4. a prohibition against Clark entering the Administration area of City Hall and

outside of Council meeting will not have any direct contact with City staff other

than the City Manager, which would only be via email, copied to all Council, and

if the City Manager agrees to meet Clark in person, the meeting must be in the

presence of another member of Council;

5. Clark is no longer to attend meetings of the Administration Committee; and

6. a reduction in Clark’s salary by 50%.

[2] The issues argued by the Applicant in this Judicial Review are: (1) The decision and motion were “coloured by bias”; (2) The decision of Council was patently unreasonable;(3) The decision was contrary to Charter values; (4) The procedure was procedurally flawed and failed to provide Clark with a fair opportunity to respond to the allegations; and (5) The sanctions imposed were unreasonable.

[3] The Applicant asks that the decision of Council be set aside, the sanctions be set aside in their entirety, Clark to be restored to her full authority as Mayor, and that her salary be restored retroactively.

FACTS

[4] The facts are not in dispute. In brief, the City Manager, Ms. Mitchell (Mitchell), suggested and made several administrative changes in 2023. It turned out that the statutory governance structure required Council to first approve these by resolution or bylaw, before they were implemented. Ms. Mitchell did not believe approval was necessary, and this was discussed between Mitchell and Clark. Clark is a lawyer, and she understood that governance rules required Council approval. The situation was reviewed at an in-camera meeting of Council on July 4, 2023, and the necessary approval of Council (after the fact) was set on the agenda of the August 21, 2023 Council meeting.

[5] Between the July 4 and August 21 meeting, Mitchell apparently changed her mind, and accepted that approval was necessary, but this was not communicated to Clark before the August meeting. Also, during this period, Clark privately requested and obtained a legal opinion about the issue, the opinion was not disclosed by her to anyone until the August 21 meeting.

[6] At the August Council meeting several Council members spoke in support of the changes. Clark explored issues in that public meeting that had been raised at the in-camera meeting, specifically around how the changes were made without Council approval.

[7] The initial exchange between Mitchell and Clark consisted of questions on the staff reorganization. Following this exchange, Mitchell conceded that any error made in the process had been hers. Clark came back to the issue and raised at that time the legal opinion she had commissioned privately. The opinion Clark received outlined that approval would be necessary for the actions not to be null and void.

[8] The interchange lasted a few minutes, and after Mitchell expressed that she felt the questioning was inappropriate, a Councillor intervened and steered the conversation back to the issue in question, whether Council agreed with the administrative reorganization. A vote was held which approved the changes. Clark conducted the rest of the meeting and the vote in a professional manner.

[9] The complete interchange that is the subject of complaint is captured in a video in the materials, located at page 51 of the record.

[10] Councillor Sharps made a formal complaint under the Code, raising two potential violations of the Code by Clark:

1. That Mayor Clark violated the Code by obtaining a personal legal opinion and disclosing it to the Council in public at the meeting.

2. That Mayor Clark violated the Code by failing to treat Ms. Mitchell with dignity, courtesy and respect and maliciously injured the professional or ethical reputation of the City Manager.

[11] Under the procedure set out in the Code, a formal investigation was conducted by a lawyer, Mr. Solowan (the Kingsgate Report). The Report found that there was insufficient evidence to establish the first potential violation, but that the second complaint was substantiated.

[12] The Report was considered at a Council Meeting on February 5, March 4, and March 21, 2024. There are minutes of these meetings that merely report the fact of discussion or a vote, no details of any discussion or reasons for the decision are recorded.

[13] At the Council meeting on March 21, 2024, Council voted in favour of accepting the Kingsgate Report and found that Clark had breached the City’s Code of Conduct Bylaw 4492 by failing to treat the City Manager with courtesy, dignity and respect during the exchange at the August 21, 2023 Open Council Meeting. Six sanctions against Clark, which are set out in paragraph 1 of this decision, were imposed.

THE LAW

Standard of Review

[14] Both the Applicant and Respondents agree that Council’s decision must be reviewed with some deference on a reasonableness standard, both with respect to its conclusions and the sanctions imposed.

[15] Here, Section 539 of the MGA is at play. It provides that “no bylaw or resolution may be challenged on the ground that it is unreasonable.” The Court of Appeal discussed section 539 in Koebisch v Rocky View (County), 2021 ABCA 265. In Koebisch, the Court outlined that section 539 prevents bylaws from being challenged on the ground of unreasonableness but does not set out the standard of review. This Court recently spoke to the assessment of bylaws or resolutions in Koester v Wheatland County, 2024 ABKB 103. In Koester, Justice Reed held that when assessing bylaws or resolutions, the Court “can and should” assess whether the statutory and regulatory framework were reasonably followed: at para 116. Even if the relevant schemes were reasonably followed, the Court should still look to all the facts and evaluate “whether the decisions to enact the bylaws or resolutions were aberrant, overwhelming, or decisions that no reasonable municipality would have taken.”: Koester, at para 116 and 123; Koebisch, at para 37.

[16] All parties agree that the duty of procedural fairness and any consideration of bias must be reviewed on the standard of correctness.

The Relevant Legislation

[17] Some limited comment must be made about the powers given to Council in the MGA, as it is through the MGA that the Code is required. In addition, the review of the decision is required to be undertaken in terms and in the context of the complete legislative scheme, which gives the Mayor and councillors certain duties, powers and responsibilities.

[18] The general duties of councillors are outlined in section 153 of the MGA. Some duties include participation in Council meetings, the development of policies and programs, and adherence to the Code of Conduct. In addition, councillors have a duty to consider the municipality’s welfare and interests and to inform Council of anything that would promote those interests. In addition to the general duties set out in section 153, the mayor would have additional duties under section 154, namely, presiding over Council meetings.

[19] The MGA allows regulations and requires a code of conduct under section 146.1(1).

[20] The Code of Conduct for Elected Officials Regulation (Alberta Regulation 200/2017) sets out the guidelines for establishing a code of conduct, a complaint system, and allowing sanctions. It provides in section 6 that “A code of conduct or any sanctions imposed under a code of conduct must not prevent a councillor from fulfilling the legislated duties of a councillor”.

[21] Bylaw 4492 is the code of conduct for the members of the Medicine Hat Council. Section 8 deals with Interactions with Council members, Staff and the Public and others.

[22] The pertinent sections of the code are:

8.2. Members shall treat one another, employees of the Municipality and members of the public with courtesy, dignity and respect and without abuse, bullying or intimidation

8.6. Members must not:

[…]

(c) maliciously or falsely injure the professional or ethical reputation, or the prospects or practice of employees of the Municipality.

[23] The rest of section 8 deals with a prohibition of the use of indecent or insulting language and contains a prohibition against speaking in a discriminatory matter. Section 9 deals with confidential information, section 10 concerns conflicts of interest and section 11 sets out improper use of influence.

[24] Section 16 sets out the formal complaint process, which sets out the requirements for the complaint procedure, including the appointment of an investigator to review the complaint and decide whether to investigate. If it is deemed worthy of investigation, the investigator is to investigate the complaint and provide the results of the investigation to Council. Procedural fairness is to be afforded to the member subject to the complaint, including an entitlement to be represented by independent legal counsel.

[25] Section 17.4 outlines possible sanctions, which are enumerated and in (h) allows any other sanction Council deems reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances provided that the sanction does not prevent a member from fulfilling the legislated duties of a councillor and the sanction is not contrary to the MGA.

THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES

The Applicant

[26] The Applicant takes the position that the Kingsgate Report, on which Council relied for its finding of a breach of the Code was flawed on four bases: Clark failed to be properly advised on the allegations and claimed facts against her; the investigation failed to properly include all the relevant parties; it failed to address properly Mayor Clark’s motivations; and it failed to address the statutory framework and duties of a Mayor in the context of the MGA and the Code.

The Applicant argues that as the Kingsgate Report was the basis of the decision by Council, the decision cannot be supported.

[27] The Applicant argues that Council was biased, as the councillors approved the municipality funding legal fees for Mitchell to bring legal action against Clark for defamation, without a formal meeting, or details of the basis of her claim. By contrast, the Applicant argues, no action was taken against Mitchell for failing to get proper approval of the reorganization, and also, for misrepresenting that Council approval was not needed and that she had an opinion from the City Solicitor, when no such opinion existed and her position was legally incorrect.

[28] The Applicant argues that the sanctions are oppressive, severe and disproportionate to the breach the Council found, and they unfairly prevent Clark from fulfilling her legislative duties as the elected Mayor, contrary to the express provision of the Code.

The Respondents

[29] The Respondents take the position that the investigation carried out and reported on in the Kingsgate Report was procedurally fair and thorough. Council considered the Report and made a finding of misconduct as a result. The Respondents argue that there is no evidence of bias. In addition, it is argued that Courts must show a high level of deference to municipal resolutions passed by Council.

DISCUSSION OF ISSUES

The Kingsgate Report

[30] All parties provided substantial argument about the Kingsgate Report, as it clearly was the basis of the decision of Council in finding that there had been a breach of the Code.

[31] The Kingsgate Report was specific that it was considering the interchange in Council that was the subject matter of the complaint, not the issue of whether Mitchell had erred in her initial assessment of the needs for Council involvement, or her conduct in advising she had a legal opinion. The basis of this was that Council had meetings where it was aware of the administrative changes, then became aware of the fact it should have approved them before they were implemented. This was discussed in previous Council meetings. The purpose of the August 21 meeting was to vote to retroactively approve the changes.

[32] As a result, the Kingsgate Report classified the discussion by Clark at the August meeting of Mitchell’s error and conduct as a personnel matter, and not the issue before Council (the administrative changes Council was being asked to ratify). Clearly Clark felt that Mitchell’s error and oversight should be discussed, and she was determined to discuss it at the public meeting.

The complaint as worded complains that the introduction of a new legal opinion and the rehash of this issue, blindsided the other councillors and was disrespectful to Mitchell. (page 103 of the Return).

[33] In relation to the first allegation, a violation of the Code by obtaining a legal opinion, the Kingsgate Report considered the situation that Clark took the position that Mitchell had told the July 4, 2023 meeting that she had a legal opinion that supported Mitchell’s opinion of the scope of her authority. The investigator considered this as the basis for Clark seeking her own legal opinion. The investigator found although this was borderline, he ultimately gave the benefit of the doubt on this allegation to Clark, even though she could have done other things to address the issue of legal advice short of getting her own opinion.

[34] The Kingsgate Report then focused on section 8 of the Code, the requirement to treat Mitchell with courtesy, civility and respect. It found that Clark was determined to make her point publicly that Mitchell had broken the law. It recognized that Mitchell was clear at the outset of the August Council meeting that she had made an error about the legality of her procedure. The investigator found that Clark did not have a duty to shine a public light on Mitchel’s non-compliance, the topic had been canvassed in camera on July 4, 2023, and that focusing on performance and conduct matters was a public calling out of Mitchell.

[35] This was the basis for finding that Clark raising a personnel issue in public was not appropriate, and she did not treat Mitchell with courtesy, dignity and respect. The purpose of her comments were to hold Mitchell publicly accountable, rather than move this issue to a private forum to work out the governance issue. He went on to find that the conduct was malicious.

[36] The Applicant’s criticism of the Kingsgate Report and the request for judicial review is largely based on the fact that Clark feels she was clearly within her rights to raise the issue of the staff reorganization at a public Council meeting, which was a point of contention between Clark and Mitchell. However, the finding of the Report is based on the fact that it was not Mitchell’s conduct or misconduct that was before Council, it was whether Council agreed to retroactively approve staffing changes that they had already known about but now recognized the changes needed Council approval in order to ratify.

Procedural Fairness

[37] Procedural Fairness is reviewed on a correctness basis.

[38] The Applicant advanced procedural concerns: that the complete interview of the complainant was not provided to her for comment, and that she did not receive the notes of the Administrative Legal Committee meeting.

[39] Although those two allegations are true, I find from reviewing the record that the Applicant was aware of the allegations. Both at the point the investigation was going on, and also once the Kingsgate Report was being considered by Council, the Applicant was given adequate notice and the chance to respond.

[40] A chronology of investigative steps attached as Appendix A to the brief of the Respondents demonstrates that there was substantial correspondence and information that went back and forth between the investigator and Clark. She was given extensions in January 2024 to respond, and time allowed for her to instruct legal counsel to be involved. The Kingsgate Report was provided to her once issued for comment, a request from her counsel for reconsideration was considered in March 14, and her counsel attended with Clark to part of the Council meeting when the Kingsgate Report was reviewed.

[41] I do not find that the actions of Council were based on a report or conduct that lacked basic procedural fairness.

Reasonableness Arguments

[42] The Applicant asks this Court to review the Kingsgate Report, which was used to inform Council in making its decision on August 21.

[43] Firstly, the Applicant argues that the investigation failed to involve all relevant parties.

The Applicant argues that the Kingsgate investigation did not involve or interview the City Manager to ascertain her view of the situation, and why she had indicated she had a legal opinion when she did not. The Applicant asserts these issues were the basis for the interrogation by Clark at the meeting in August.

[44] Secondly, the Applicant argues that the report failed to address Clark’s Motivations. The Applicant argued that the investigation framed the exchange with Mitchell as a personnel issue, which should have been dealt with in a closed-door meeting; rather than recognizing the issue was about a vote by Council to implement the reorganization, which came to be because of a governance issue which Mitchell had failed to raise.

[45] Thirdly, the Applicant argued that the report failed to address the statutory framework and duties of the Mayor. The Applicant argued that pursuant to section 135 of the MGA, councillors are required to obtain information about the operation and administration of the municipality from the City Manager. The Applicant’s position is that the City Manager is accountable to Council, and the Applicant was simply trying to elicit information about the operation and administration of the municipality, this was not a personnel discussion.

[46] The analysis of these arguments has to be done in the context not only of this meeting, but the history of the matter. Here, the Council had been informed of the proposed changes during 2023. The changes were not the issue, in fact the council ultimately voted in favour of them. The need for the administrative changes and resulting staffing issues was not contentious.

There was a governance issue that arose; Council should have approved them before they were done. This omission was discovered and discussed at an in-camera meeting. The item had been discussed and was set over for a vote at a public meeting for the ratification of the administrative and staffing changes.

[47] The questioning at the August Council meeting by Clark was going over old ground, in the public meeting. Clark was emphasizing that there had been previous discussions, and questioning how Council’s approval was missed. She had armed herself with a legal opinion that she obtained privately, without any discussion or the knowledge or approval of Council. In addition, Clark raised concern with Mitchell’s conduct, after Mitchell admitted that she made an error.

[48] Despite the submissions of the Applicant, the time and place for the extended discussion or delving into the error was not at this Council meeting. The issue before Council was the ratification of the changes, something the Council was well aware had happened and appeared eager to approve. The process was important, but this was not the forum.

[49] Thus, the fact that the Kingsgate Report did not interview Mitchell is reasonable, Mitchell was not the complainant. The Mayor’s motivations were to return to a previously discussed matter. The issue for the investigator was to focus on the respect and wording used by Clark.

[50] The decision of the Kingsgate Report is not unreasonable. The Council adopted the report, but did not find malice, it found only that the mayor had failed to treat the City Manager with courtesy, dignity and respect during the exchange at the August 21, 2023 Open Council Meeting. The rationale for the decision is evident in the Kingsgate Report, it is a reasonable decision and logical in light of the evidence. It is a reasonable conclusion that Clark went beyond the topic on the agenda and wished to deal with personal differences the two women had over a legal point that had been earlier discussed.

Bias Arguments

[51] The Applicant argues that decision of Council was “coloured by bias”. This is based on the fact that the Council allowed a request by Mitchell to be indemnified for her legal fees in bringing a defamation action against Clark, with no detailed consideration of its chance of success and while the Kingsgate Report was being produced. Also, the Applicant argues that Council was not prepared to admit its failure to follow proper procedure and took no action against Mitchell for her misrepresentation about the legal opinion. In addition, there was a presentation by George Cuff to Council, alluded to in the affidavit of Clark, which she states allowed him to chastise her.

[52] The Court of Appeal has set out the test for a reasonable apprehension of bias in Fitzpatrick v College of Physical Therapists of Alberta, 2019 ABCA 254 at para 38: The test for determining whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias is whether an informed person, reviewing the matter realistically and practically, would have a reasonable apprehension of bias. The ground must be serious and substantial. There must be a real likelihood or probability of reasonable apprehension of bias not just a mere suspicion.

In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada has also confirmed that assessing bias is a contextual exercise which considers the nature of the decision maker and the decision being made: Newfoundland Telephone Co v. Newfoundland (Board of Commissioner of Public Utilities), [1992] 1 SCR 623 at 638, 89 DLR (4th) 289; see also Stubicar v. Calgary (Subdivision and Development Appeal Board), 2019 ABCA 336 at 25.

[53] I do not find that Clark has met the onus to show that an informed person would have a reasonable apprehension of bias. Council was called on to make a decision on the legal fees question. The question of following up on the legitimacy of the Bylaw is not the focus of the determination. There is no evidence that the presentation by Cuff influenced Council, or that it was designed to or did create a bias of the councillors.

Charter Breach Arguments

[54] The argument by the Applicant about the breach of Charter values was brief. Generally stated, the suggestion was that the Charter overrides the Code and that Clark was entitled to comment on the matter in the public interest during the August meeting. She was engaging in “expressive comment” which should override any restrictions in the Code.

[55] The Applicant discusses two cases of the Municipal Integrity Commissioners of Ontario in relation to the Charter argument; Sinnott et al. v. McConkey, 2021 ONMIC 4 and Ayotte v

Therrien, 2022 ONMIC 10.

[56] When dealing with the Charter in the administrative context, the Doré analysis applies.

As set out by the Court of Appeal in Canadian Centre for Bio-Ethical Reform v Grande Prairie (City), 2018 ABCA 154, a Court will first look to the statutory objective being promoted and then determine the reasonableness of the impugned decision. In dealing with the freedom of expression, the Court held that a decision will be reasonable when the limit on expression is proportional to the statutory objective, and the right to free expression is minimally impaired; at paras 64-65.

[57] I do not find the Applicant’s Charter arguments to be applicable in this case. At the August 21st meeting, Council met to deal with the matter of staff reorganization, not the performance of the City Manager. The risk of having council debate chilled is a concern that the investigator considered in making his report. The investigator found that the exchange could not be considered a Council debate as the subject matter was one that should have been dealt with privately.

[58] When one balances the Charter objectives of expressive comment, in this situation it does not in any way trump the Code.

The Sanction Imposed

[59] Council decided on the sanctions. This was within their power. The Applicant argues that the sanctions were severe, totally disproportionate with the conduct, and are patently unreasonable.

[60] In addition, the Applicant argues that the sanctions offend section 6 of the Code, which requires that the sanction must not prevent a councillor from fulfilling his or her legislative duties.

[61] The Applicant argues that the Record does not indicate why such a severe remedy was decided upon by Council, based on the conduct of the Mayor in a few minutes at one meeting. It is argued that the sanctions imposed are disproportionate and without any rational or reasonable reasoning when considering the conduct.

[62] The Respondents argue that the context is that Clark had seriously breached her obligation under the Code by improperly questioning Mitchell publicly about a personnel issue. It is argued that the sanctions were reasonable to reduce opportunities for friction between the Clark and Mitchell, and to ensure the business of the City could move forward in a collaborative and respectful fashion.

[63] Under a disciplinary scheme, regulatory sanctions are not intended to be punitive and there must be proportionality between the wrongdoing and the penalty: Kissel v Rocky View (County), 2020 ABQB 406 at para 231; Vavilov at para 107. This Court has found that levying “crushing or unfit sanctions” can have the effect of undermining public confidence in an institution and its processes, ultimately defeating the purpose of their conduct enforcement system; Kissel at para 233; see also Walton v Alberta (Securities Commission), 2014 ABCA 273 at para 154

[64] When I review the sanctions, they are on the face very severe. They appear disproportionate with the conduct. Sanctions that are aimed at limiting contact or assuring respectful communication with Mitchell are rationally connected with the breach of the Code.

Thus, a letter of reprimand, the request for an apology, and a limit on how communication is done with Mitchell, or a requirement that Mitchell have some control over in person meetings are reasonable and appear connected with the concern.

[65] Having said that, the suspension of Clark’s presiding duties under section 154 of the MGA, that she no longer be the official spokesperson for Council, that she no longer can attend meetings of the administration committee or that her salary is reduced by 50% (with no limit in time, effectively a financial penalty of over $50,000) are hard to justify. There is no indication the issue was her inability to deal with other staff, or with governance issues. After the intervention of a Councillor at the August meeting, Clark continued to chair the meeting appropriately, to call for a vote on the question calmly and competently. There was no suggestion she was unable to chair the meeting or represent the City. Clark was elected Mayor of the City, these latter sanctions in essence strip her of a significant portion of her role as Mayor.

[66] The breach of the Code would appear to be in relation to a conflict of opinion about governance issues. It does not appear to deal at all with Clark’s ability to be a spokesperson for the City, or her ability to preside at Council meetings. To prohibit her from entering the administrative area at City Hall, or having contact with City staff is hard to relate to what was said and done, or the tone in which it was said and done at the August meeting. Clark continues to be bound by the Code in terms of her interaction with any staff member of the City. The background of the friction that developed between Mitchell and Clark over the governance issue is not frivolous, it was an important governance matter. It is hard to reconcile what was said and done in the August meeting with the sanction that Clark cannot attend committee meetings, or with the magnitude of the financial penalty.

[67] When I review the extent of the sanctions, particularly 2, 3, 5, 6 and portions of 4, I find that they are overwhelmingly disproportionate to the breach of the Code and no reasonable municipal council would have taken that decision.

Remedy

[68] Generally, the remedy when a decision is impugned in judicial review is to send the matter back to the administrative body to reconsider the decision with directions. However, declining to remit a matter back may be appropriate in certain circumstances. Elements such as the efficient use of public resources may influence a court’s discretion in remitting a matter.

Courts must also be alive to a matter becoming an “endless merry-go-round of judicial reviews”: Vavilov at para 142.

[69] Remitting the matter back in this case would mean sending the issue of sanctions for the conduct back to Council, whose members appear to have no sense of proportionality in crafting sanctions and have imposed sanctions that have no rational connection with the breach of the Code. In fact, it appears at first blush that Council went down the Sanctions that may be imposed as enumerated in 17.4 of the Code and ticked a box for each sanction (a) through (g).

[70] As a result, I will strike out sanction 2,3,5 and 6 as disproportionate and unreasonable.

Sanction 1 is upheld as it is reasonable.

[71] Rule 3.24(2)(a) of the Alberta Rules of Court, AR 124/2010 gives the court jurisdiction to direct Council to reconsider the whole or any part of a matter. Sanction 4 creates an issue as any part of it that deals with communications and meetings between Clark and Mitchell is reasonable. Restricting or monitoring their communications and allowing meetings only as necessary in the presence of at least one other person is rationally connected to the breach of the Code. However, a total prohibition of Clark entering into the administration area of City Hall, or having any direct contact with City staff other than the City Manager is disproportionate. It also unreasonably restricts Clark in her duties as Mayor, to mean she cannot have direct contact with any City staff anywhere. The Mayor’s duties require her to be in places in Medicine Hat on city business, or representing the City where City staff members will be present, and some interaction necessary.

[72] The Councillors understand how access to the administration area of City Hall intersects with Clark’s duties as Mayor. As well, the Councillors have an appreciation of the interactions necessary between the Mayor and city staff. As a result, I am sending the issue of sanction 4 back to Council so they may reconsider the appropriate restriction that reasonably protects the City Manager but does not restrict Clark from performing her duties as Mayor.

Heard on the 13th day of August, 2024.

Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 26th day of August, 2024.

R.E. Nation

J.C.K.B.A.

Appearances:

Grant N. Stapon, K.C.

for the Applicant

Daina Young,

for the Respondent City of Medicine Hat

Michael Swanberg

for the Respondent The Council of the City of Medicine Hat

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